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Abstract
This thesis examines the Internet public relations content of Mali’s Tuareg rebel group,
the Mouvement National de la Liberation de l’Azawad (MNLA). Content analysis grounded in
speech act securitization theory is applied to the 259 posts on the MNLA’s primary French
language website in order to determine if MNLA website posts correlate with the events
occurring in the northern Mali conflict. The data reveals that various characteristics of MNLA
statements do correlate with events in the conflict. What the MNLA says provides important
insight into the organization and the conflict itself. The identified correlations allow for MNLA
rhetoric and activity to be predicted by analysts based on what events may occur or are
occurring related to the northern Mali conflict.
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1. Introduction
Mali is located in the highly volatile Sahel region of Africa. The Sahel sits roughly between the
Maghreb to the north and sub-Saharan Africa to the south, stretching from Senegal in the west to
Eritrea in the east. Mali, as well as several of its neighbors in the region, is the modern remnants
of French colonialism in Africa. Its borders are drawn in awkward geometric shapes which
reflect Berlin Conference-style colonial interests as opposed to the actual distribution of precolonial ethnic and socio-political communities. These miscalculated borders led to the
separation of many ethnic groups, particularly in Mali, and pushed previously unconnected or
already conflicting groups to clash with one another. The road to effective self-governance and
territorial integrity for Mali continues to be a difficult one, due in no small part to these ethnic
fractures.
Ethnic and political conflict in Mali is not evenly split but the main division tends to be
between black Africans in the southern part of the country and Arab populations in the northern
portion. Figure 1 displays the distribution of various ethnic groups in Mali. Despite the fact that
Mali is almost universally Muslim (primarily Sunni), Arab populations in the North have felt
disadvantaged, ignored, and abused by the central government in the southern capital, Bamako.1
These issues are further exacerbated by a lack of representation in government, including the fact
that every Malian president has been black and was born in the southern portion of the country, a
region dominated by the Mande people, specifically the Bambara ethnic sub-group.

1

Figure 1. Ethnic Map of Mali
Source: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, October 2003.

The primary Arab ethnic group that has taken up cause against these perceived injustices
in Mali are the Tuaregs, a nomadic pastoralist people with Berber ancestry. The Tuareg people
inhabit several countries including Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Morocco, Niger, and Tunisia,
as shown in figure 2, but have been involved in direct conflict against government rule most
prominently in Mali. The Tuaregs have revolted against French colonial rule in the French Sudan
(in the 1910s and 1920s) and have risen up several times against the Malian government during
the post-colonial period (in the 1960s, 1990s, and 2000s). However, these revolts have been
accompanied by violent repression compounded by a history of droughts in region.2 The most
2

recent Tuareg conflict took place in 2011-2014 with confrontations continuing, albeit on a
smaller scale, into 2015.

Figure 2. Area of Tuareg Population in the Sahel
Source: British Broadcasting Corporation: Mali Crisis, Key Players, March 12, 2013.

While many Tuaregs express similar frustrations with the Malian government, the
populations of Northern Mali are hardly a united front. Tuareg clans have conflicts with one
another as well as with regional terrorist organizations who are at present considered enemies of
Tuareg liberation.3 Tuareg clans and other groups have fought amongst each other for control of
contraband (primarily drugs) and smuggling lanes in Mali. They have also fought both for and
against the Malian government as their situation in relation to other groups has changed.4 The
most active terror organizations challenging the Malian government and Tuareg organizations
for control of security and political space in northern Mali are Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM), Ansar al-Dine, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). The
Tuaregs have had brief working relationships with the various northern Malian rebels and
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terrorist organizations but they broke down largely due to ideological and territorial
disagreements.5
The primary Tuareg organization to emerge amidst the groundswell of active groups in
northern Mali in 2011 was the Mouvement National de la Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA). The
MNLA claims to represent Tuaregs as well as several other beleaguered ethnic groups in
northern Mali. The organization seeks to ease socio-political problems in Mali by forcing the
secession of the entire northern region of Mali into a state called Azawad. Other organizations
such as Le Front National de la Libération de l’Azawad (FNLA) and Ganda militias fight for
similar concerns related to northern Mali’s ethnic groups but have largely been overtaken in the
past three years by the MNLA. The “Fifth Tuareg Rebellion” from approximately 2011 to 2014
was put down by a combination of Malian government forces and a strong, highly effective
military campaign by France.6 However, the MNLA was not destroyed or dissolved and
continues to be involved in skirmishes with various sub-state groups and Malian forces.7
The Malian military and its allied forces continue to have little to no operational control
in most of northern Mali. A lack of effective security control in the Azawad region and the
unstable political atmosphere in Bamako contribute to an environment in northern Mali and the
Sahel that is conducive to the development and proliferation of rebel militias and terrorist
organizations. This environment has allowed Tuareg rebels, now represented primarily by the
MNLA, to present themselves first as anti-colonial rebels battling France and then as insurgents
challenging Mali’s abusive government.8
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2. Literature Review
2.1 Non-State Violence in the Sahel
The literature on non-state violence can help explain the behavior of rebel groups such as the
MNLA. Violence against governments, other organizations, and even civilians cannot be reduced
to opaque madness. Civil war, or any other sort of domestic uprising, is a transformative
phenomenon.9 Rebels have intentions and goals, albeit sometimes vague and fluid, and parties to
domestic conflicts do not commit wanton violence simply for its own sake. A study of Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA)10 manifestos showed that the group, despite non-governmental
organization (NGO) efforts to prove otherwise, was not an insane cult characterized by madness
with no political objective. Identifying power relations and analyzing political rhetoric of parties
involved in a conflict can help contextualize, but not excuse, such groups’ atrocities and explain
bloody, protracted battles.11 Contextualization is important to understand how local conflicts can
have significant effects on the broader region in which they take place. Transnational
mechanisms of regional conflict and instability can also have impacts on local conflicts but these
effects can be lesser than those the local conflict has on the region as well.12 From this
perspective, conflict in Azawad may have an important influence on Sahelian security while also
influencing trans-Sahelian events and actors at the same time. Trans-Sahelian events and the
MNLA battle for an independent Azawad are intrinsically connected.

2.2 The Malian Context
The plethora of domestic issues faced by Malian authorities has often forced them to treat transSahelian problems as peripheral. The Malian government is more concerned with controlling its
own territory and preventing coups than with earmarking significant resources for addressing
5

transnational issues in northern Africa. The lack of strong and effective government in Sahelian
states has been considered as the reason for the evolution of opportunistic rebellions.13 Mali is a
weak state lacking effective government and sufficient provision of services and resources in
most sectors, particularly in its northern territories.
Rather than labelling the MNLA as opportunistic, it is more accurate to describe the
organization as the most recent rejuvenation of a long-standing ethnic and regional opposition to
the Malian government. The MNLA can be considered opportunistic in how it filled a power gap
in the early 2010s in northern Mali after the failure of Tuareg opposition groups to break and
overturn the Malian government several years before. However, the issue of simply gaining
power for the sake of ruling over Mali does not appear to be at the MNLA’s core. Rather the
movement seeks sovereign control of its own section of the country, or at least securing greater
provision of resources and political representation from Bamako. There is no certainty that the
MNLA or any other group in Mali will necessarily turn the country into a participatory
democracy or strengthen the fibers of what remains a weak state.14 Part of the difficulty and
incompatibility between the government and the MNLA can be attributed to the difference
between the largely settled, urban lifestyle in the capital as compared to the rural, nomadic
lifestyle not only of the northern Malian ethnic groups but of rebel groups in general. Additional
factors such as the bulk of the national population and the center of the Malian political arena
being based in the south around Bamako play critically divisive roles as well.15 This can explain
why Mali/EU military victories and fragile, weakly enforced treaties between the government
and the Tuaregs have been the only answers to conflict in northern Mali thus far. These factors
prevent the Tuaregs and other disadvantaged ethnic groups in the North from ever having a
sustained peace or mature political relationship with the southern government.
6

Decentralization has remained a primary concern of the MNLA. Spreading control over
influence and resources from the political center in Bamako to the periphery has been a longstanding issue in Mali. Government legislation has so far been highly complex and has had
limited effects. Yet where decentralization has taken place local communities have gained more
control over natural resources and land usage rights.16 However, this has not taken hold across
Mali and most of the benefits are seen in the periphery of the southern part of the country. This
localization of efforts can be explained by ease of access and cost of transportation from Bamako
to the southern part of the country, lack of government security in the north, and some degree of
racism towards Arabs. Government efforts and rulings often clash with local customary law and
conventions related to ownership of land and resources. These clashes contribute to the failure to
effectively decentralize government control of resources and to general socio-political tensions.17
The Malian government’s efforts, based largely on modernized ideas of law, often do not mesh
with entrenched local customs, which for the nomadic Tuaregs, can date back hundreds if not
thousands of years.
Predictions that decentralization programs tested by the Malian government in the early
2000s would help relieve socio-political and ethnic tensions were wrong.18 In the decade since
these programs were launched, improvements largely failed to reach northern Mali and have
clearly not eased tensions with the Tuaregs. Different policies are needed in different geographic
and demographic regions in order to effectively implement decentralization policies in Mali.
Nuanced policy analysis is required to make any sort of decentralization plan work, during
peacetime or wartime.19 If a better political situation or relationship exists, cooperation on socioeconomic policies may be easier, leading to less need for top-down reforms. However, if the
politicization of northern Malian conflicts continues to center around open or latent ethnic
7

divides, decentralization is unlikely to ever proceed.20 The government will not so willingly
negotiate control over resources with those they are fighting with, especially if the opponent has
arguments based on long-standing ethnic issues. If the Malian government wants to genuinely
extend socio-economic and security reforms to northern Mali, both to aid the population and ease
the continuous conflict, it will have to concurrently address the political situation and develop a
more comprehensive policy.21
Tensions in Mali are not eased by the lack of regional security and stability in the region.
Stability in northern Mali is linked to that of Libya as well as to the presence of terrorism and
organized crime in the region. The Sahelian security is strongly linked to political conflict in
Mali.22 Porous borders and clandestine networks and routes that pre-date the colonial era allow
for traditional nomads to ignore contemporary state boundaries. They also facilitate transnational
terrorism, crime, and rebellion; for instance Tuaregs who used Libya as a rear base. The Sahel
presents a regional security challenge not only because of the numerous difficulties of individual
states but also due to its size. The vast region contains swathes of near-empty desert but also
roads, pathways, and cities traversed by a wide variety of individuals.23 Concerns about religious
and ideological radicalism persist in the region due to the movement of terrorist groups from the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region into the Sahel. These concerns are compounded
by the fact that individuals from the Sahel were known to have gone through Al-Qaeda training
camps alongside the large Islamic population of most states in the region.24 These regional
demographic and geographic factors are outside of Mali’s control and play a critical role in
defining the MNLA’s separatist conflict.
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2.3 The Transnational Nature of Malian Conflicts
Existing research in transnational conflict suggests that the regional presence of terrorists, weak
states, porous borders, and radical Islam in the Sahel have empowered Malian separatists.25
Researcher Ersel Aydlini suggests that apoliticization, informality, and demonopolization of
international security cooperation are the main themes in the expansion of state and sub-state
entities into the transnational realm.26 The Mali-Sahel relationship is different because of the
presence of several functioning NGOs and regional organizations in the Sahel and a high degree
of transnational movement among the populations who reside there.27 Yet the Sahel continues to
fail at state security cooperation, particularly regarding rebels and terrorists, which opens the
way for French military influence. Transnationalism certainly exists in the Sahel but security has
failed to successfully emerge in the region, casting doubt upon Aydinli’s analysis. 28
Foreign influences, both African and non-African, are important to understand the
northern Mali conflict. The Mali-Sahel security relationship therefore is not simply one where
Azawad separatists drive regional security responses by themselves or one where EU and Sahel
states control every aspect of the response to the threat posed by these militants. Rather, power is
traded off intermittently between Mali, Malian militants, and outside actors; and therefore
various forces drive the geopolitical narrative at different times. France has demonstrated this
ability in the 2011-2014 rebellion by responding to the Malian government’s request for military
aid. The French subsequently crushed the Tuareg rebellion and began giving direction and
training to Malians on how to handle security affairs. 29
Similar to the current state of affairs, a major aspect of the weakness of intra-African
relations during the Cold War was its fragile autonomy in regards to stronger foreign powers
who could impose themselves on the weak system of political relations in Africa.30 French and
9

British military interventions as well as the significant economic involvement of countries such
as China and Russia in Africa have demonstrated the continuing relevance of this analysis. A
strong regional coalition benefits weak states such as Mali who have trouble successfully
negotiating on their own. It is unlikely that Malians who were already opposed to the Tuareg
rebellion were unhappy with France’s timely and effective intervention. However, those same
Malians were left to ponder what the status of the Malian government and its security
relationships, or lack thereof, with neighboring states was when the 2011-2014 rebellion was
allowed to become so dangerous to the state. Assistance by outside powers in civil wars is a
typical aspect of war, stressing ideological and material rather than national competition.31 The
situation of Mali, and possibly that of the entire Sahel, indicates that the phenomenon of
ideological motivation for foreign intervention in developing world conflicts is not dead. Other
drivers have replaced communism, including fears of Islamism, terrorism, or Tuareg-style
liberation movements.
The upsetting of international or regional order is still a major concern for world powers,
with France demonstrating how keen it is to help preserve political-military order in central
Africa.32 The fact that military capabilities have been at the center of African socio-political
dynamics and foreign interventions attests to the role outside powers play. International and
regional organizations have been willing to intervene in certain African conflicts but when
extreme emergency responses are required for those conflicts, foreign states often take the lead
in protecting vulnerable governments and civilian populations.33 This pattern has been true for
Mali which, since its independence, has never really been able to consistently maintain state
control over the entirety of its territory. Transnationalism in the Sahel can either be a source of
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empowerment or of weakness, depending on how Malian authorities prioritize domestic and
Sahelian security challenges.

2.4 State Reformation and Conflict Resolution in Mali
Achieving long-term success after an intervention or even simple conflict reduction requires
addressing the three primary concerns of security-building in troubled regions of Africa: resource
capability [or management], sovereignty, and subgroup political demands.34 These securitybuilding concerns in Africa are evident in Mali and are visible pillars in the liberation argument
of the MNLA. If Tuaregs are not afforded adequate resources by their national government,
remain able to effectively control territory in Mali in direct opposition to the national
government, and have legitimate complaints about their political representation at the national
level, then they will be more likely to attempt to build security for themselves in the form of
fighting for their own state. Sovereignty, or pseudo-sovereignty in Azawad, is wielded as a
socio-political and military rallying concept against the government but is used concurrently as
an argument to convince northern Malian inhabitants and the international community that the
MNLA is a better and legitimate leadership option in the region.
Mali’s government has so far been unable to manage a significant amount of rebel and
terrorist on its own soil and it relies on foreign actors to address issues that arise during serious
domestic upheavals. This dependence keeps Mali in a weak position because challenges to
effective governance are only temporarily fought off and not permanently removed. The Malian
government and Tuareg separatists have entertained a difficult relationship since the colonial era.
This stalemate between two actors who cannot control security over the entire country is causing
greater instability in the Sahel than if one side simply won out. Gilbert M. Khadiagala similarly
11

posits that militaries will become less important in Africa if deep-seated conflicts can be resolved
or managed, allowing regional institutions and organizations to better promote development and
security in those regions affected by conflict.35 The question is how those deep-seated conflicts
can be resolved if even managed. Strengthening state security in Africa has been a hallmark
feature of interventions but has yet to really take hold in states like Mali. Until effective change
is made, the role of the military will remain the decisive factor in Sahelian conflicts. In order to
bring an end to ongoing civil conflict, the Malian military or the Tuareg rebels will likely need to
conquer the entirety of Mali. The victor will ideally lead an effective transition into a capable
national government. Even then, military victory does not assure such successful socio-economic
development or political organization.
Mali and the Sahel are inextricably linked in terms of regional security and development.
Regionalism can be considered as a project or policy designed to bring order and not just an
analytical frame used to explain conflict.36 The combined political machinations of international
and regional organizations, national governments, and sub-state groups such as the MNLA will
all impact on the future of “Sahel regionalism.” The influence of non-regional powers,
particularly France, plays a considerable role in this state – region relationship. The decision to
intervene and the result of any intervention are predicated on the nature of the intrastate conflict,
the nature of the intervener and their intervention, and whether that intervention is slanted
towards the government or the rebels.37
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3. Research Questions
The answers to the who, what, and why questions of conflict in northern Mali can be addressed
by examining the nature and motivations of the Malian government, active rebels and terrorists
in northern Mali with an emphasis on the MNLA and the French government. Determining how
the MNLA orients its narrative at different stages of the conflict is beneficial to understanding
not only the nature and motivations of the MNLA but also how future clashes may play out. The
MNLA, in the regional security context, acts as a lens to examine the situation of Mali, and more
broadly, that of the Sahel.
This thesis seeks to answer the following central research question: Are there any
correlations between MNLA statements and conflict-related events in northern Mali? Two
secondary research questions complement this first question: What factors elucidate the
correlations or lack thereof between MNLA statements and conflict in northern Mali? Are there
general themes across MNLA statements that explain correlations between those statements and
conflict-related events?
To answer these questions one main hypothesis is made: (1) MNLA post content will
correlate with major events in the northern Mali conflict. This hypothesis is made because the
MNLA are the first Tuareg resistance movement in Mali’s long history of rebellions to establish
a large online information apparatus. Since there is three years’ worth of content to examine, the
purposes of the MNLA’s online presence are not easily or quickly discernable. However, it
would behoove the MNLA to post content during and around events related to the conflict in
which they are fighting in order to support their politico-military efforts through the use of
information. Three secondary hypotheses are made to add depth to the main hypothesis: (2) there
will be a greater number of statements during months with more events. The logic here is that
13

there are more events during a particular time frame then there will be more opportunities for the
MNLA to publicly anticipate or react to them; (3) there will be more statements and harsher
rhetoric around the times of events related to the French intervention. The French intervention
was undoubtedly a watershed moment in the conflict. Since the French supported the Malian
government in the intervention and the French are a dominant politico-military power in the
Sahel, the MNLA will want to speak frequently and aggressively towards this perceived neocolonialist force; (4) the MNLA will put forth more statements regarding their politics and
human rights than on the specifics of battlefield operations. Since the MNLA is much smaller
than its opponents it will prioritize political and diplomatic victories with powerful external
actors. The MNLA will also want to minimize information coming from the battlefield,
especially if they suffer losses at the hands of larger and better-equipped militaries.
If confirmed these hypotheses will help explain how rebel groups respond to changes in
their security environment. The three secondary hypotheses will be easily confirmed or
disconfirmed through basic calculations once the data is collected. The central hypothesis will be
confirmed if the various quantitative and qualitative aspects of MNLA public statements
correlate with what his happening in the northern Mali conflict. In other words, will what
happens in Mali during the Tuareg rebellion explain what the MNLA chooses to say? The central
hypothesis will be disconfirmed if what the MNLA chooses to say does not correlate with the
events in Mali during the Tuareg rebellion. There are two primary ways this could occur. Either
there is a lack of any identifiable correlations or patterns between events and MNLA rhetoric or
the same themes occur almost universally across MNLA statements and there is little identifiable
difference between what is said and what is occurring on the ground.
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4. Methodology
The research method used for this thesis is content analysis. The analysis focuses on MNLA
public statements from their primary French language website from 2011 to 2014.38 The MNLA
French language website was selected because it is the most comprehensive and thorough body
of statements directly from the organization. Analyzing modern internet content connects the
interests of producers and consumers while also exploring how these roles can be challenged and
re-explored.39 The purpose of internet content analysis is to re-explore an old conflict with a
new, rigorous methodology on a new media platform. To facilitate these methods, a descriptive
approach is taken in the content analysis. This approach limits conclusions to the content being
studied, promotes clarity and parsimony, and aims to reveal the relationship between Azawad
separatist militancy and the larger Sahelian security context.40
The examination also draws upon frame analysis. Frames are “cognitive schematas that
guide social interaction through communication.”41 A frame can be linguistically analyzed as a
speech act using four categories: the (1) promoter, or the person or organization who functions
as the speaker. The (2) target is the person or entity that forms the audience. The (3) referent,
or topic, forms the propositional content of the speech act. The final category is the particular (4)
intention in making the speech act.42 The framing method covers each aspect of a message or
document while allaying the concerns of propaganda analysts and methodologists who argue that
content analysis, particularly research that examines the frequencies of certain characteristics,
cannot strongly generalize to larger contexts. This research bridges existing policies to the
characteristics displayed in the content of a person or organization’s messages.43 Content
analysis in this thesis is conducted without any type of electronic software or automated data
analysis. The analysis is done in person so that characteristics will not be assigned to messages
15

without sufficient context. Conducting content analysis in person allows the context and brevity
of the message to be conveyed in a richer manner.
Posts from the MNLA website are sorted into separate timelines based on the four
framing categories (promoter, target, referent, intention) and then further into sub-categories.
The use of frames and timelines allows for an original and more comprehensive analysis of the
MNLA Internet public relations content. This approach allows for an examination of the
evolution of the website content over a specific period of time and aims to identify and compare
patterns. Particular attention will be paid to specific events that have marked the conflict in
Northern Mali from 2001 to 2014. This method essentially takes into account two datasets in
producing a single set of conclusions, thereby strengthening the findings. At the end of the
analysis there will be a qualitative observations sub-section where noticeable trends that emerged
in the data outside of the framing categories are discussed. This allows for a more nuanced
analysis by highlighting some additional patterns in the posts that are only partially revealed in
the quantitative analysis.
The framing analysis is broken up into the four main categories which are further divided
into several sub-categories.
(1) Promoters are sub-categorized as follows:
(a) names without a listed association are MNLA representatives in varying positions
within the organizational hierarchy;
(b) names with a listed association are members of that specific media, government, or
organization;
(c) all posts listed as the “MNLA”, “Le congrès”, “Fils de l’Azawad”, or any variation
upon these are authorized by unnamed MNLA representatives.
16

(2) Targets are sub-categorized as follows:
(a) international community denotes a general global audience with particular emphasis
on their governments;
(b) African community: Citizens in every African country across the continent with
particular emphasis on their governments;
(c) Malians denotes the general populations of Mali including Azawadis;
(d) Tuaregs are the Tuareg people in all countries, particularly in the Sahel;
(e) a country denotes that specific country with particular emphasis on its government;
(f) international organizations, both governmental or non-governmental;
(g) specific organizations denotes the leadership and members of the listed organization;
(h) media refers all media organizations across the world but in particular those regional
and international media organizations who have focused on Mali recently;
(i) Malian government denotes the leadership of the interconnected Malian government
and military; and
(j) regional community, or those countries, and specifically their leadership bodies, in the
general Sahel or northwest African region.
(3) Referents are sub-categorized as follows:
(a) human rights which generally refer to the plight of the Azawadi people or any other
peoples specifically mentioned as being mistreated, typically their respective governments;
(b) politics-international relations refers to the MNLA’s relations with other groups,
governments, or organizations anywhere in the world;
(c) history-philosophy which refers to the MNLA’s history or socio-political/military
philosophy;
17

(d) personnel announcements refer to the death of or the gaining of new MNLA
members;
(e) military refers to military operations of the MNLA;
(f) religion refers to any mention of any religion.
(4) Intentions are sub-categorized as follows:
(a) activism, or an effort by the MNLA to promote its goals and gain popular support of
all kinds;
(b) politics-international relations, or an effort by the MNLA to make a political
statement or to clarify or explain a political position regarding any group, state, or organization;
(c) military, or an effort by the MNLA to promote and/or justify its military operations;
(d) military victory, or when the MNLA communicates or specifically explains a positive
result for the MNLA in a military operation;
(e) military loss, or when the MNLA communicates or specifically explains a negative
result for the MNLA in a military operation.
At the start of each section, timelines displaying the frequency of each sub-category of
the four primary framing categories will be displayed in a chart format. Dates of selected critical
events regarding conflicts in northern Mali during the 2011 to 2014 period are highlighted along
the timeline. These events, inserted on the horizontal axis along the timeline, are called
“transition points” and can be seen in figure 3.44
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• January 2012 – First Tuareg attacks in northern Mali
• March 2012 – President Amadou Toumani Toure deposed by military; African Union (AU)
suspends Mali
• April 2012 – Tuareg rebels seize northern Mali, declare independence; President
Dioncounda Traore takes over in military to civilian transition of power
• May 2012 – MNLA and Ansar al-Dine merge to declare northern Mali an Islamic State; AlQaeda in North Africa endorses arrangement
• June 2012 – Ansar al-Dine and Al-Qaeda turn on MNLA, recapture and enforce
fundamentalist Islam in major northern cities of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal
• December 2012 – Prime Minister (PM) Cheick Mobido Diarra resigns, President Traore
selects Mr. Django Sissoko to succeed him; UN and US threaten sanctions
• January 2013- Islamists capture Konna and prepare for assault on Bamako; President
Traore requests French help, In Operation Serval French forces re-capture, Timbuktu, Gao,
and Kidal – the last major rebel-held cities, EU pledges to help retrain Malian army
• April 2013 – French forces begin withdrawal, regional African force keeps peace in Mali
• June 2013 – Tuareg rebels and government sign peace deal
• July 2013 – Ibrahim Boubacar Keita wins presidential elections
• September 2013 – Mali government and Tuareg separatist clashes return in the north
• April 2014 – President Keita appoints July 2013 election rival Mr. Moussa Mara to PM to
help curb growing instability in the north
• May 2014 – Government-Tuareg truce falls apart and rebels capture Kidal among several
smaller cities
• September 2014 – New rounds of government-Tuareg rebel talks in Algeria; an Azawad
embassy is opened in the Netherlands
• October 2014 – Nine United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in
Mali (MINUSMA) peacekeepers killed in northeastern Mali, worst attack on UN workers in
Mali conflict
• November 2014 – Ebola virus reaches Mali
Figure 3. Transition Points in the 2011-2014 Northern Mali Conflict
Sources: “Mali Profile,” BBC News Africa, November 12, 2014; “Timeline: the Malian crisis,” France 24,
January 25,
\\\2013.
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Examining the types and frequencies of MNLA messages that were sent at the times of
these events will help measure the MNLA reaction to changes in the Malian security
environment. An examination of the changes in rhetoric surrounding the transition points
follows the content analysis. This process helps describe the strength and depth of the links
between the observed characteristics of the messages and the antecedent political conditions
within the relevant constructs of the MNLA, Azawad, and Mali proper. This methodology has
been broken into six distinct tasks: (1) read all MNLA posts on their primary website; (2)
organize each post by the four main categories; (3) organize each post into appropriate subcategories; (4) create a timeline for each category – sub-category combination; (5) place each
timeline underneath the transition points; (6) analyze correlation, or lack thereof, between
transition points and categories, sub-categories, and total posts.
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5. Analysis
The analysis is divided into six sub-sections, starting with an overview of all of the posts,
then an examination of the four securitization frames, and finally a sub-section on some
additional qualitative observations. The first five sub-sections will look at each category and subcategory in a quantitative fashion followed by a summary of what the overall data indicates. The
final qualitative examination will address general trends in MNLA public statements noted
during the data collection phase of this research. A graph of the category and sub-category totals
precedes each of the first five sections. A complete list of all of the posts on the MNLA website
which comprise the dataset can be found in the Works Cited section.
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5.1 Total Posts
The analysis of total posts is intended to reveal characteristics of MNLA public relations by
examining how frequently the movement posts on the website, regardless of the topic. Between
November 2011 and December 2014 the MNLA posted 259 times. There are thirteen total posts
in 2011, 108 posts in 2012, 56 posts in 2013, and 75 posts in 2014. With the exception of five
posts in Arabic and two in English, all posts were written in French. Regarding total monthly
posts, there were ten months with ten or more posts, nineteen months with four to nine posts, and
ten months with three or less posts. The average number of total posts per month is
approximately 6.4 posts. During all ten of the months with three or less posts there were only
zero to one significant events related to the northern Mali conflict. During the ten months with
ten or more posts four months had zero events, three months had one event, and three months
had two events.
While there is a correlation between fewer events and fewer posts there is not a clear
connection between more events and more posts. While less need for commentary during a lull
in action is not unexpected, the MNLA does not always appear to be motivated to respond to all
events in a similar fashion. The first five months with ten or more posts, December 2011 and
January through April 2012, are explained by the beginning of the rebellion and the associated
early victories of the MNLA. The movement needed a strong start both militarily and for
information operations purposes. The overthrow of Malian President Toure by the military and
subsequent suspension of Mali from the African Union was capitalized upon by the MNLA.
They released flurries of public statements and won a series of military victories across northern
Mali which included the capture of considerably large swathes of territory. In December 2012
Malian Prime Minister Diarra resigned, and President Traore selected the new PM Sissoko. At
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the same time the government weathered UN and U.S. threats of sanctions. The MNLA saw the
deterioration and attempted to anticipate the reshuffling with more public relations statements.
February 2013 was the seventh month and came after the French “Operation Serval” intervention
that, along with re-trained and re-organized Malian forces, recaptured almost all of the critical
areas away from the Islamist terror groups and the MNLA. The MNLA had a good relationship
with the intervention forces and did not see much combat with them.
It was not until May 2014 that ten more posts were made in a month again. These posts
coincide with the collapse of a set of tenuous agreements between the MNLA, other rebel
groups, and the Malian government. As fighting continued and the MNLA scored some small
victories, more information efforts aimed to support military operations on the ground. The
MNLA needed to justify its return to arms and the breakdown of the previous peace agreements.
The final two months with ten or more total posts in the dataset are September and October 2014.
In September new talks were started between northern Mali rebels and the Malian government in
Algeria and an Azawad embassy was opened in the Netherlands. More posts appeared discussing
the talks and making the argument for greater concessions in the MNLA’s favor. In October,
jihadist attacks on MINUSMA peacekeepers led to the deadliest period for UN forces in Mali.
The MNLA sought to separate themselves from these jihadist organizations as much as possible,
particularly MUJAO who took responsibility for the killings.
Several months in the dataset feature lesser numbers of posts. The first month with three
or less posts was December 2011. The website started only one month before and the rebellion
commenced one month later. The larger number of posts in November indicated the launch of
the website. These postings also communicated to the regional and international community the
pertinent issues that would be related to the upcoming conflict. December featured fewer posts;
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the MNLA appearing hesitant to post as frequently in light of the impending conflict. The second
month was June 2012. This month featured the breakdown of some tenuous alliances with AQIM
and Ansar al-Dine and some significant losses of territory for the MNLA. The two surrounding
months of May and July had no more than six posts each. It would not be until the summer of
2013 that a major decrease in the number of monthly posts occurred. June through August 2013
featured a combined total of three posts. The only major events to occur in this three month span
were the signing of a peace deal between the rebels and the Malian government in June and the
election of President Keita in July. The majority of the French forces had largely withdrawn by
the summer of 2013 and government-rebel relations were calmer, but not completely stable. The
MNLA did not feel the need to keep making public statements during this lull in action but their
postings picked back up towards September, when clashes between the rebels and the Malian
government returned.
As 2013 came to a close more low posting months began to appear. The next three
months with three or fewer postings are December 2013, February 2014, and April 2014. After
initial clashes in the beginning of fall 2013, the winter and spring of 2014 saw few posts until
May 2014 when the conflict resumed on a large scale. The MNLA was waiting until this return
to conflict to restart larger scale information dissemination. The final two months with ten or less
posts are August and November 2014. August came just before the new rounds of peace talks
between the MNLA, other rebels, and the Malian government in September while November
saw the Ebola virus reach Mali. The MNLA may have felt their bargaining position was
relatively clear and held off on making too many statements before seeing what approach the
Malian government was taking to the negotiations. It could be argued that the MNLA were
playing a close hand but since the MNLA did not bring anything particularly new or surprising to
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the negotiating table in Algeria, it is more likely they felt openly comfortable in their particular
situation before the talks began. Ebola was never explicitly mentioned as an issue by the MNLA
nor was Mali as a whole significantly affected by the virus. The lack of posts for November may
be better explained by the MNLA simply staying quieter as the negotiations in Algeria unfolded
and limited combat left less to report on.
At the most general level, a pattern emerges in the dataset that explains the total number
of posts per month and deviations from the average number of posts per month can be explained.
The MNLA tends to post less when it experiences military and political losses and when it is
anticipating the recurrence of conflict or the beginning of new talks relevant to the conflict
between rebels and the government. Once the conflict restarts the MNLA posts more frequently.
The MNLA attempts to post more when on-the-ground operations increase, most likely to win
over the “hearts and minds” of local, national, regional, and international audiences while
establishing and documenting their right to rebellion against the Malian government. These
findings regarding total posts confirm the central hypothesis, that posting by the MNLA does
correlate with events on the ground in northern Mali. The MNLA posts more often or less often,
regardless of the topic, based on the frequency and timing of various conflict-related events. The
analysis now moves to the study of the four main securitization categories.
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5.2 Promoters
MNLA promoters are the movement’s members empowered to write on the MNLA’s online
public relations apparatus. There are 21 different MNLA promoters across the MNLA website
postings. The vast majority are MNLA members of varying rank. The MNLA also
communicated the proceedings of negotiations, meetings, or interviews with journalists. Some
posts are directly credited to more than one promoter but the majority of posts only had a single
promoter. This section of the analysis will primarily focus on the peaks of certain promoters as
opposed to periods of time where many promoters only posted once or twice. Seeing who is
entrusted to have their messages posted the most frequently not only gives insight into which
actors or leadership positions generally have the most access to MNLA website posting but could
also reveal a correlation between the most active promoters and events on the ground.
The six promoters who had at least one month with five or more posts are the MNLA,
Ougastan Ag Ahmed, Moussa Ag Acharatoumane, Moussa Ag Assarid, Mossa Ag Attaher, and
Bakaye Ag Hamed Ahmed. With the exception of Ag Ahmed, all of these promoters have at
least ten total posts over the entirety of the dataset. Two promoters who have more than ten total
posts but never have five or more in a single month are Khoumeidy Ag Acharatoumane and Bilal
Ag Acherif. The generic MNLA promoter is used sparingly throughout the dataset with the
largest concentration between November 2011 and February 2012. Starting out the uprising, the
author of the posts most likely wanted to develop a greater cohesion among the MNLA and its
audiences, showing solidarity by not signing individual names. The two most active individual
promoters within this four month time frame are Ag Ahmed and K. Ag Acharatoumane with Ag
Assarid and Ag Attaher also getting a post in each. Any of these leadership members could have
written the post but there is no way to actually know for certain. Therefore, whoever the writer
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was may have desired to instill at the beginning of the uprising, and at occasional points
throughout the years, a sense of solidarity and unification under the MNLA banner rather than
ceding rhetorical authority to individual leaders.
All that is known about Ougastan Ag Ahmed is that he was chargé de communication
with the MNLA. Ag Ahmed posted six times in November 2011 and has not been credited with a
posting since. While there were no events during this month, it was the time of the formation of
the MNLA and the start of the rebellion in 2012. Ag Ahmed was clearly playing an important
role in the formative days of the MNLA and the rebellion but the reasons for the cessation of his
posts, as with almost all of the other promoters, are relatively unknown and probably lie within
the internal decision-making structure of the organization. He was replaced by a new chargé de
communication but no specific explanation for the change was given.
Khoumeidy Ag Acharatoumane wrote 13 posts between January and May 2012. During
this time K. Ag Acharatoumane wrote a weekly piece, among a few others, entitled “A week in
Azawad,” covering a wide slate of issues related to the conflict in northern Mali.45 It remains
unclear what K. Ag Acharatoumane’s position was or if he was simply an MNLA member with
communication skills that the organization exploited in the early months of the conflict. Given
that K. Ag Acharatoumane signed most of his posts “For the MNLA” and then his name, the
latter appears more likely. There is a possibility that M. Ag Acharatoumane and K. Ag
Acharatoumane are the same person or are somehow related. Alongside Ag Ahmed, K. Ag
Acharatoumane appears to have been an important part in getting the MNLA’s information
apparatus off the ground at the start of the rebellion.
Moussa Ag Acharatoumane had one post each in January and May of 2012 while the
rest of his postings are confined to September through December 2014 with a combined posting
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total of 25 for that period. M. Ag Acharatoumane has held both chargé de communication and
chargé des droits humains positions. M. Ag Acharatoumane’s first two posts coincide with the
beginning of conflict in January 2012, and the failure of the MNLA’s relationships with terrorist
groups in the region and subsequent loss of territory in May 2012. These events were critical
stages in the early development of the uprising. As a communications and human rights leader of
the MNLA, M. Ag Acharatoumane was entrusted to make important statements during this
period to the general public. With the exception of a handful of posts, M. Ag Acharatoumane
also wrote all of the posts from September to December 2014, totaling 25. All of these posts
were signed either chargé de communication or “For the coordination”, signaling that M. Ag
Acharatoumane had likely been appointed head of public relations as the peace talks started in
September 2014 and more conflict-related events unfolded in the region, including attacks by
terrorist groups. The “For the coordination” signature that began to appear near the end of 2014
refers to the MNLA attempting to make statements on behalf of the variety of separatists and
rebels in northern Mali who formed a loose rebel conglomerate with which to negotiate with the
Malian government. The reason for his absence between May 2012 and September 2014 is
unclear but, to this day, he continues to be the primary MNLA chargé de communication.
Moussa Ag Assarid is a Malian-French author and actor who is an active MNLA
supporter. With the exception of one post in January 2012, Ag Assarid wrote all of his posts
between July and December 2012. Ag Assarid’s single, compelling piece in January 2012 was
part of the information surge at the beginning of the conflict entitled “The profound reasons for
my revolt and my adhesion to the MNLA.”46 Ag Assarid was one of the primary chargés de
communication for the MNLA from June to December 2012 as well. He wrote a number of press
communiqués and meeting summaries for the MNLA and specifically for the Conseil Transitoire
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de l’Etat de l’Azawad (CTEA), the main governing body of the organization. This period
featured a number of significant events in the northern Mali conflict including losses to terrorists,
political turbulence in Bamako, and the general course of conflict only about six months after the
start of the uprising. The reason for his posting absence from after 2012 is unknown. It is
possible that the CTEA no longer wanted to keep him on as a Chargé de Communication or that
he wished to spend more time on some of his own career pursuits, particularly given the
MNLA’s politico-military outlook at the time.
Mossa Ag Attaher posted with the highest frequency and consistency relative to his
MNLA promoter counterparts. Ag Attaher posted in 19 of the 38 total months and accumulated
77 posts, more than twice the amount of the next closest promoter (Ag Assarid with 32). Ag
Attaher posted once in January 2012 and then posted in bursts from January 2013 to August
2014. Ag Attaher is identified as yet another chargé de communication and as a porte-parole, or
spokesperson. The reasons for a number of individuals being listed with these official titles are to
spread out responsibility and permit those leaders to have transferrable skills in case a current
chargé de communication becomes incapacitated. It also allows for individuals within the
leadership to experience different roles in the organization to create more well-rounded leaders.
His initial post, in January 2012, was likely part of the initial round of introductions into the
MNLA’s online public relations apparatus. Getting all the leaders to post was likely important to
the MNLA to establish communication and confidence at the outset of the conflict. His posts
varied in monthly totals between January 2013 and August 2014 but missed posting at all during
only two months.
Ag Attaher’s posts covered a wide variety of topics and coincided with a number of
important events. Four of Ag Attaher’s peak posting months contained significant events or were
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right around the time of significant events. He had seven in February 2013 which was the month
following the French intervention and re-capturing of territory from Islamist groups. Having
been given some time to take effect, Ag Attaher was charged with taking stock of the
intervention and the place of the MNLA at this important crossroads in the northern Mali
conflict. November 2013 saw eight posts from Ag Attaher and was the month which followed
the return of clashes between the Malian government and separatist forces. Likewise, Ag Attaher
had 13 posts in May 2014 which was the month when another Malian government-rebel truce
fell apart and conflict resumed. The two times tenuous peace agreements failed and conflict
restarted, Ag Attaher was leading the frontline of public relations. His final peak month was July
2014, roughly two months into the latest round of hostilities. This period began to see an
increased presence of Islamist groups that damaged both MNLA and Malian government efforts.
Alongside K. Ag Acharatoumane and Ag Assarid, Ag Attaher was the leading voice for the
MNLA at some of the watershed moments in the organization’s history.
Another promoter worth mentioning is Bakaye Ag Hamed Ahmed. All of Ag Hamed
Ahmed’s postings were in a four month period in 2012 with one post each in January and
February, ten in March, and four in April. As yet another chargé de communication, Ag Hamed
Ahmed contributed two early 2012 posts in the information surge at the outset of the uprising.
The rest of Ag Hamed Ahmed’s posts in March and April 2012 coincide with Malian President
Toure being deposed by the Malian military, the suspension of Mali from the AU, and then the
MNLA’s consequent major seizures of territory across northern Mali. At the time, Ag Hamed
Ahmed had either been in the role by coincidence, in a sort of rotation, or was specially selected
to write the messages for this period. Either way he made considerable headway in the four
month period, writing 16 total posts.
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The final individual who was a significant promoter is Bilal Ag Acherif, Secretary
General of the MNLA. Ag Acherif had 19 total posts but never more than three posts in one
month. Ag Acherif had five total posts between April and June 2012, twelve total posts between
October 2012 and May 2013, and one post each in September 2013 and May 2014. The April
through June 2012 posts coincide with the early turmoil in the Malian government, the
consequent MNLA victories, and then the failure of the disastrous relationship with the local and
regional Islamist groups. The latter two months of September 2013 and May 2014 directly
coincide with the MNLA’s return to arms after ceasefires and treaties with the Malian
government failed. Ag Acherif’s posts are primarily major MNLA announcements and
declarations related to core stances of the organization in relation to the conflict and other states
and groups. Furthermore, occasional posting on the part of Ag Acherif lent the organization a
helpful media presence and provided the MNLA’s audiences with evidence of active leadership.
There were a number of other promoters besides the ones discussed in this sub-section.
However, the content and number of posts on the MNLA website from these individuals were
too insignificant or low to warrant extended discussion here. It will suffice to say that the
promoters were primarily a combination of military and civilian MNLA leadership. What
emerges from this analysis is a clear trend in promoters. With the exception of a crowded
promoter field in the earliest months of the dataset there are one to two promoters posting at any
given time with one dominant promoter at all times. There are small overlaps at certain points
but some of the changes occur precisely by the month. In November 2011 Ag Ahmed was the
dominant promoter and adopted the generic MNLA signature. The MNLA signature was then the
dominant promoter until February 2012 when an overlap with K. Ag Acharatoumane and Ag
Hamed Ahmed began. K. Ag Acharatoumane and Ag Hamed Ahmed were co-dominant
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promoters until mid-2012. This early congestion was likely due to the MNLA organization trying
to manage the intense start-up of the rebellion. From mid-2012 onward the pattern became
clearer. From mid-2012 to late 2012 the dominant promoter was Ag Assarid with Ag Acherif as
the secondary promoter, 2013 features Ag Attaher as the dominant promoter with Ag Acherif as
the secondary promoter, early to mid-2014 featured Mossa Ag Attaher as the dominant promoter,
and in late 2014 M. Ag Acharatoumane took over as the dominant promoter. The slew of
promoters not featured in this sub-section can be considered a variety of co-secondary promoters
throughout the respective time periods in which they had messages posted.
This pattern indicates that the chargé de communication is a rotating position in the
MNLA and changes as the organization’s leadership sees fit, based on the current, prevailing
situation. This pattern also means that the history of the MNLA public relations posts is divisible
into roughly five eras according to dominant promoters or the dominant chargé de
communication of the time period: from 2011 to early 2012 (Mixed MNLA, Ag Ahmed); early to
mid-2012 (K. Ag Acharatoumane, Ag Hamed Ahmed); mid-2012 to late 2012 (Ag Assarid);
early 2013 to mid-2014 (Ag Attaher); and late 2014 to present (M. Ag Acharatoumane). The
pattern in promoters is yet another step in confirming the central hypothesis that the MNLA
intentionally posts in concert with particular events. Not only is this correlation present but the
promoter responsibility is so highly organized over different periods of the rebellion by the
MNLA that it is highly unlikely the pattern is a coincidence.
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5.3 Targets
The MNLA targets a variety of groups in its postings. Fourteen different target audiences were
identified in the MNLA’s website posts from November 2011 to December 2014. These
audiences fell into two groups based on total posts. The first group is made up of the four targets
appearing in more than 20 posts: the international community; Malian citizens; international
organizations; and the regional Sahel community. The other ten groups appeared in one to ten
posts over the entirety of the dataset.
237 out of the 259 total MNLA posts in the dataset included the international
community as a target audience. The data reveals that the MNLA genuinely wants to dispel its
narrative beyond Mali, the Sahel, and France to the rest of the world. Bringing the MNLA’s
message to this level shows a desire to elevate the current uprising above local and national
concerns to the regional and international stages. Noticeable peaks for the international
community are between January and April 2012, November 2012, February 2013, May 2014,
and September to October 2014.
The early months of 2012 have a number of posts whose target audience is the
international community. Early in the uprising the MNLA saw the opportunity for a
transformative change in this conflict compared to historical precedent, by taking their narrative
to a global audience in a way the movement largely had not been able to do before via the
Internet. The MNLA released 52 posts with the international community as a target between
January and April 2012 alone. During the early stages of the conflict this was an important
audience to reach out to not only to justify their actions and attempt to garner support but also to
capitalize upon military victories on the ground. The posts during the brief alliance with AQIM
and Ansar Al-Dine, from May to June 2012, and the MNLA’s military difficulties in the months
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after the failure of the alliance also suggest that the MNLA probably wanted to significantly
reduce the publicity of this tumultuous relationship. It did not take long for the MNLA to work
diligently through their public relations posts to separate themselves from these Islamist groups
as much as possible after the brief alliance failed. the MNLA realized that these relationships
would not be conducive to earning the sympathies of outside states and international
organizations.
The November 2012 spike in the international community target came after the large
series of MNLA and Malian government losses to Islamist groups. This spike also came just
before the December 2012 Mali government tumult and the January 2012 French intervention, as
the Islamists closed in on Bamako. The February 2013 spike came just after the successful
French intervention and likely resulted from the MNLA attempting to re-establish good relations
with the intervention forces and the rest of the on-looking international community. Getting
public relations with the outside world back on track after losing ground and legitimacy to the
Islamists for the several months was an MNLA priority. Another spike in May 2014 directly
correlates with the collapse of the rebel-Malian government truces and the return to conflict.
Justification for a return to conflict and an attempt to convince the international community that
the MNLA should get more concessions in future negotiations based on the government’s
unwillingness to avoid conflict were major themes. Finally, September to October 2014 was the
beginning of the new round of rebel-government talks in Algeria, the opening of the new
Azawad embassy in the Netherlands, and some clashes between Islamists and UN forces. The
spike of international community-targeted posts was likely meant to support the MNLA’s
position in negotiations and continue to put distance between themselves and the Islamists.
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The second target audience of MNLA posts are Malian citizens. The MNLA frequently
referred to Malian citizens in Azawad but also included Malians who lived in the South to target
a wider audience. Malians as targets, in 57 total posts, are spread fairly evenly across the dataset
but there were a few larger pockets of posts during certain months. From November 2011 to May
2012 there are approximately twelve posts with Malian citizens as a target audience. This series
of posts was intended to inform Malian citizens about the events of the early uprising and get the
citizenry with access to the Internet on board with the MNLA’s ideals and operations. There was
a relatively small grouping of posts with Malians as targets from late 2012 to early 2013,
correlating with the Malian government’s political difficulties and then the entrance of France
into the conflict to stave off the Islamist advance. Late 2013 saw Malians targeted by the MNLA,
particularly in the period after the September return to conflict. The MNLA apparently had a
brief public relations surge in this period to get their countrymen to support their efforts in the
renewed conflict. May 2014 was the next significant month of Malian-target posts and the
highest for Malians with ten posts. This coincides with the May 2014 truce failure and the
MNLA capture of Kidal and other territories. From June to December 2014 there were 14 more
posts in a final MNLA surge trying to reach their Malian audience. This likely means that the
MNLA was working to convince Malian citizens, among other stakeholders, to support their
negotiating position in Algiers. The posts also express how the MNLA found the attacks on UN
peacekeepers completely abhorrent.
International organizations were targeted 30 times across the dataset either in a larger
list of international organizations or simply under the term “international organizations” itself.
There is a group of posts from 2011 to mid-2012 when the MNLA was drawing attention from
almost all available audiences to gain support at the commencement of the rebellion. A second
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grouping from late 2012 to early 2013 occurred when the conflict shifted rapidly from MNLA
success to losses, as a result of the Islamist advances and the French intervention. From mid2013 to the end of 2014 there were few appeals to international organizations. The MNLA
appears to have had less focus on convincing international organizations that their fight and their
socio-political stance was correct and decided to put more effort into anyone in the international
community who could have sympathy on their struggle. Appeals to state-level leaders willing to
aid the MNLA against a far less appealing contingent of Islamist organizations like AQIM were
also a probable focus.
The final target with a significant number of posts was the regional community with 21
total posts. The regional states and non-state actors which comprised the community were
targeted fairly evenly across the dataset with spikes of three in May and November 2012 as well
as of four in November 2013. May and November 2012 coincide with the MNLA’s brief alliance
with AQIM and Ansar al-Dine in northern Mali. May and November 2012 were also in the
period leading to the December Malian government turmoil which saw leadership change hands
and Islamist groups make significant territorial gains, respectively. Finally, November 2013 was
one of the first months after the failure of a government-rebel truce and a return to hostilities.
The MNLA was then attempting to reach out to regional states in an effort to gain support for
their stance in the conflict and to justify their various alliances. The MNLA also called for
intervention from regional organizations, particularly ECOWAS and the AU, to help in the
conflict itself both before and after the major interventions by France and the UN.
With the exception of the very general international community, which was targeted
consistently over the dataset, the three specific target audiences the MNLA was concerned with
were Malians, international organizations, and the regional community. It is possible that these
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three targets were some of the most important actors the MNLA call upon for attention and
support. The MNLA needs Malians, both Azawadis and southerners, to support their cause.
Without the “hearts and minds” of their local populations the MNLA will have trouble holding
and governing territory. International organizations like the UN have long been concerned with
African conflicts and the potential for states, such as France, to get involved if they feel national
interests are challenged. This occurs less often regarding rebels like the MNLA than Islamist
groups like AQIM. The MNLA’s noticeable efforts to separate themselves from the Islamists,
particularly after mid-2012, shows a much more globally nuanced approach by the
organization’s leadership. Alliances with groups like AQIM may have short-term benefits but
large-scale support is unlikely to come from international organizations and states if they are too
closely associated with terrorist and Islamist groups. Such alliances may also attract unrequested
foreign interventions.
Finally, the regional community has always been a fluid but critical stakeholder in the
northern Mali conflict. State and non-state group stability and willingness to fight may ebb and
flow but the porous borders and transnational ethnic identities that characterize the Sahel mean
conflicts rarely stay completely localized. The Tuareg fighters who returned to help the MNLA
after fighting in Libya and Algeria attest to this fact. Based on the data, the MNLA appears to
call upon these internal and external stakeholders at a time of crisis or when it anticipates an
impending crisis. This is not wholly unsurprising but large gaps between surges in posting
targets for the individual categories suggest that the MNLA pursues anyone who may be able to
help in that moment rather than appeal consistently to certain targets across the course of their
struggle. This indicates a lack of strategic vision to some degree for the MNLA in their fight.
Limited targeting of states such as France, Algeria, and the United States as well as
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specific organizations such as ECOWAS and various NGOs (Human Rights Watch and
Reporters Sans Frontières, for example) indicates that either the MNLA can only afford to post
in a more blanketed fashion or it is unsure of who to publicly appeal to given the ever-changing
nature of the northern Mali conflict. However, the emphasis on the four major sub-categories
highlighted in this sub-section indicates that the MNLA’s generalized, blanketing strategy
correlates regularly across the dataset with conflict-related events. If the movement is unsure
who to specifically target at certain moments then it trusts that as major events occur, that it can
anticipate or respond to those events with regular appeals to the international community, Malian
citizens, international organizations, and the regional community.
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5.4 Referents
The referents, or topics, of the MNLA’s posts fell broadly into six categories: human rights,
personnel announcements, history-philosophy, religion, politics-international relations, and
military. Human rights, politics-international relations, and military were the three most common
referents across the dataset with personnel announcements, history-philosophy, and religion
appearing far less often. The gap between the two groups of categories is noticeable and may
reflect genuine priorities.
Human rights were a major MNLA referent from November 2011 to March 2012,
totaling 30 posts. The early months of the MNLA formation and the uprising required the
organization to use its information apparatus to create and disseminate the narrative of Malian
government abuses against Azawadis. Starting this dialogue and presenting the movement firmly
as the victim was a goal for the MNLA in order to gain support and militarily challenge the
Malian government. This strategy was necessary to counter the rhetoric emanating from Bamako
as the hostilities ensued. September and October 2013 saw a combined twelve posts on human
rights which came exactly at the point when rebel-government hostilities resumed in Mali, once
the majority of the French intervention force had pulled out. Re-establishing the narrative of just
cause and righteous rebellion was important in justifying a return to arms after a somewhat brief
cessation in conflict. The final spike of human rights referents was in May 2014 with six posts.
That month a recent government-rebel truce had fallen apart and conflict started back up again.
Justifying the return to conflict and instilling in the memory of all audiences the abuses suffered
by the Azawadi people at the hands of the Malian government was needed to inspire support for
the struggle over the two years since it began.
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Politics-international relations had several spikes across the dataset, yet again reflecting
the MNLA’s deference to different topics. The first grouping of politics-international relations
posts contains 20 posts and runs from February to April 2012. In this three month period the AU
suspended Mali, President Toure was deposed, President Traore came to power in the militarycivilian transition, and the MNLA was able to seize the majority of northern Mali. Having
captured swathes of territory, the MNLA anticipated further conflict and some form of
negotiations in the future involving other states and international organizations. The MNLA
needed to clarify their policy goals, the actors to request help from, and their stance towards
other stakeholders in the conflict in order to achieve the movement’s objectives. Peaks in August
2012 and November 2012 comprise the period of the Islamist takeover of northern Mali but
before the period of the French intervention. A spike in February 2013 came during the period of
the French intervention. The months with higher numbers of posts about politics and
international relations did not coincide with months during which major events occurred. It is
possible that the MNLA saw opportunities during these two watershed periods to try and
strengthen their political relations with other states and organizations, while working diligently
to oppose the actions of both the Malian government and the Islamists in order to earn a more
favorable position with outside actors when military interventions or peace talks took place. This
strategy appeared to work as the MNLA had a rather good relationship with France during its
intervention.47 Further spikes occurred in November 2013, May 2014, and from September to
October 2014. November 2013 was in the period of renewed conflict a few months after the
French intervention force left and the brief rebel-government truce fell apart. The May 2014
spike directly coincides with the dissolution of the later truce and another return to hostilities.
The September to October 2014 peak coincides with the beginning of the Algiers talks, the
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opening of the Azawadi embassy in the Netherlands, and the major attack on MINUSMA
peacekeepers. All of these periods were important junctures for the MNLA to renew
communications and strengthen public ties with outside stakeholders, particularly states, and to
shore up support in a conflict that evolved on a monthly basis.
Military referents in MNLA posts had three main peaks across the dataset. The first was
January to April 2012 with a combined 31 posts, approximately November 2012 to March 2013
with 27 combined posts, and May 2014 with eleven posts. These three spikes are correlated with
the major stages of conflict across the dataset. January to April 2012 was the outset of hostilities
that saw the MNLA take large swathes of territory, including major cities. It is likely that the
MNLA wanted to advertise their presence and their victories to any audiences willing to listen,
particularly domestic ones to gain further support for their movement. November 2012 to March
2013 was the period of the Islamist surge towards southern Mali up to the French intervention.
This period saw considerable fighting and the MNLA had to carefully balance its military
operations against the Malian government and competing Islamists groups with the French
intervention. The MNLA balancing act appeared to work. After the French intervention, the
MNLA kept fighting with the government and the Islamists. But, the movement managed to stay
in a relatively strong position given the power and precision of French operations as evidenced
by the maintenance and effective return to conflict by the MNLA several months later. The final
peak was in May 2014 after the truce fallout with the government. Hostilities ensued and posts
about military operations restarted so that the MNLA could inform the public of operations as
well as justify them given the length of the conflict at that point.
The final three referent categories appeared far less frequently but deserve some brief
attention. Personnel announcements occurred in relatively low but consistent numbers across
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the dataset. These announcements largely regarded the defection of certain personalities and
fighters to the MNLA cause as well as the deaths of a few individuals. Such announcements are
apparently reserved for high ranking MNLA members and sympathizers who were well-known
in northern Mali. The most noticeable peak for these announcements was in December 2014
when five posts mentioned the deaths of MNLA members and sympathizers.48 Several of these
deceased individuals were senior founders or historically important people associated with the
MNLA.
History-philosophy was also mentioned a few times in a relatively consistent manner
across the dataset. The highest number of posts was early in the conflict (2011-2012) when the
MNLA was working to establish its public narrative and claim to victimhood. Otherwise there is
little in the way of correlation with major events. Finally, religion was only mentioned in three
posts across the entirety of the dataset. All three posts were relatively innocuous and contained
no radical language. On May 1, 2012, a post celebrated the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, or the
end of Ramadan. On August 18, 2012, the publication of a letter by the Ulemas, or holy leaders,
of Azawad which demonstrated support for the independence of Azawad and encouragement for
Islam to be the official religion of the new state. Another post, on September 26, 2014,
celebrated Tabaski, a major Malian and Sahelian Muslim religious festival also known as Eid alAdha. The two holiday posts both included notices that fighting would cease at least for a few
days to prepare for and honor the occasions. These religious posts are consistent with the
MNLA’s long-existing character of being comprised almost entirely of Muslims but running
their organization and operations in a highly secular fashion.
Referents of MNLA public statements correlate with events in the conflict, providing
further support for the central research hypothesis. There is a strong connection between events
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and the topics that the movement chooses to discuss, particularly with the dominant human
rights, politics-international relations, and military referents. These three topics almost entirely
encapsulate the aims of the MNLA and are therefore employed frequently but strategically to
serve the movement’s goals and objectives.
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5.5 Intentions
The intentions behind the MNLA postings in the dataset were the strongest reason for not
conducting automated content analysis. Promoters, audiences, and referents could have been
given reasonable attention by software but intentions would have been difficult for a program to
pick up on, creating the necessity for a human reader to make accurate determinations about the
core reasons for posting content. Five types of intentions in MNLA postings are examined:
activism; politics-international relations; military; military victory; and military loss.
Activist intentions were dominant from November 2011 to March 2012. Establishing a
victimhood narrative and justifying a movement to arms against the Malian government was
apparently important to the MNLA’s operations and political relations. Activism for the MNLA
cause, usually purported in the form of the suffering of northern Malian Muslims and various
ethnic groups, was a natural starting point to getting the international community on the side of
the MNLA at the outset of the conflict. Peaks in February and May 2013 occurred during the
French intervention period and the MNLA’s efforts to develop positive relations with foreign
intervention forces and observers. Such activism not only helped to grant more legitimacy to the
MNLA’s arguments but put the organization on a positive footing with stakeholders involved in
the negotiations. The final spike of activist intention posts was May 2014, the month of the rebelgovernment truce failure and return to arms. Gaining support for the MNLA cause was
especially important then, since the conflict had dragged on for over two years and the breaking
of a peace deal would certainly not have been taken lightly by most stakeholders or observers. In
between these peaks there was a small but steady stream of activist intention posts to
continuously remind all audiences of why the MNLA’s fight was just and important both in Mali
and beyond.
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The most common intention posts were related to politics and international relations. It
is not surprising that a public relations platform was used primarily by the MNLA for issuing
political statements, clarifying stances on different political issues, and establishing relations
with other sub-state, state, and international entities. Politics-international relations saw peaks in
January to May 2012, from November 2012 to February 2013, September to November 2013,
and May to December 2014. To avoid rehashing the oft-repeated events during and around these
periods it suffices to say that posts clarifying political stances towards other actors coincided
directly with the most noticeable periods of conflict across the timeline. Early 2012 featured
rebel victories against the government, late 2012 to early 2013 was the period of the Islamist
surge into southern Mali which necessitated the French intervention, late 2013 saw the postintervention peace fall apart and clashes return in northern Mali, and mid to late 2014 was the
collapse of another truce and a return to hostilities before major negotiations started in Algeria.
Given that conflict occurred fairly regularly across the timeline and various truces and
peace deals were negotiated, only to fall apart, and be considered once again, the MNLA needed
to use its public information platform to tell its constituents and international actors what its
demands and positions were. The MNLA desired to make clear their opinion towards the stances
of other states and international organizations regarding the northern Mali conflict. The
movement continued to counter-balance the rhetoric from Bamako to try and win information
battles against the Malian government when the MNLA may not have been winning tangible
victories. The movement issues statements with political intent quite frequently but primarily
when fighting is actually taking place not only to counter Bamako and regional Islamist efforts
but also to empower its own political identity. The MNLA does not want to be categorized as
another Islamist rebel group simply trying to use violence to pry power away from state entities.
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The movement wants to establish strong political relations with states and international
organizations, albeit on favorable terms. By pushing the Azawad narrative the MNLA intends to
force the identification and recognition of a different state deserving of separation from an
abusive government, mimicking that of South Sudan’s independence process.49
Since conflict occurred regularly across the timeline, leading to several thousand deaths,
it is not surprising that posts with military intentions were present. However, these posts were
limited in number compared to activism and politics-international relations intentions. The point
of a military intention post is to promote and explain not necessarily the MNLA’s cause and
demands but their military operations. A basic military intention can be accompanied by posts
communicating a military victory or loss but it does not have to be so. Military intentions are
scattered across the dataset, but February 2012 and May 2014 stand out as brief spikes. These
were critical fighting months during the conflict and unsurprisingly the MNLA found the need
and opportunity to release statements on military operations. Smaller peaks are seen in the data
and represent the same pattern of information release regarding the evolution of military
operations. As the Malian government experienced turmoil, the MNLA and Islamist groups
battled, or negotiations were imminent, the MNLA chose to remind its audiences that their armed
wing was constantly ready for battle.
The final two intentions of MNLA posts are to communicate military victories and losses.
Military victory posts clearly coincide with the brief periods of noticeable MNLA success in the
conflict. From January to March 2012 there were 18 posts regarding MNLA victory during their
sweeping early-conflict success. One more spike reached eight posts in November 2012, when
there were several battles between the MNLA, Islamist forces, and the Malian government. May
2014 saw a brief spike of victory announcements for the MNLA after the truce fell apart. Besides
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these peaks, military victories in reality and in MNLA public relations were few and far between.
It does appear that the MNLA were quick to capitalize on battlefield victories with public
statements in order to further convince audiences, particularly domestic ones, of their
righteousness and success. The MNLA needed to do this given the limited number of clear
victories they had over the entirety of the conflict.
Military losses were announced highly infrequently. There was a peak of three in
February 2013 as the MNLA lost ground and notoriety to the French and Islamists, either by
force or by the decision to not militarily engage the intervention troops. One or two posts per
month are scattered across the dataset and a clear pattern does not necessarily emerge. Given the
MNLA’s various standings throughout the conflict it is likely that some losses were not reported
while the ones that were reported were likely able to be spun into a positive public relations post
for the organization. Simply losing ground to Malian forces at various points would not support
the MNLA’s efforts but reporting on executions by the Malian forces or bombings by Islamist
organizations could serve to strengthen the MNLA’s moral and socio-political standing to
observers.
The findings in this sub-section strongly support the central hypothesis. Military loss and
military victory posts were neatly correlated with the battlefield situation the MNLA faced. The
three dominant intentions of activism, politics-international relations, and military correlated
with the relative situation of the MNLA as well. Activist posts were authored when the MNLA
felt the need to alert the domestic and international communities of their plight in order to garner
further support particularly during the start of the rebellion and difficult events during the
conflict. Politics-international relations posts were authored when the MNLA needed to develop
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stronger formal ties with various actors related to the conflict and military posts reflected the
MNLA’s operations on the ground during major battles, interventions, and offensives.

5.6 Qualitative Observations
General qualitative observations of MNLA posts can bring more light and depth to this
research. The 2011 to early 2012 period was dominated by impassioned human rights rhetoric
and a strong effort to delegitimize the Malian regime under President Toure. The effort to
delegitimize and debase consequent Malian regimes did not change but the human rights rhetoric
was somewhat less impassioned as the conflict went on, referring to historical injustices less and
less. It appears the MNLA began to focus more on its struggle and the abuses it received as part
of the Azawad population. It is also important to note that there was minimal reference in the
posts to the coup by General Amadou Sanogo, who ousted President Toure. This was despite the
human rights concerns leveled against the Malian military, the Toure regime, and Sanogo’s
coup.50 President Toure came up sporadically as an example of the dysfunction in Bamako but
was rarely a topic of central attention. The MNLA may have been attempting to strike a balance
between any topic or event that drew too much attention away from their fight but could also be
used in the right proportion to strengthen the rebel cause.
A point that began to crop up in early 2012 and took flight across mid-2012 postings was
the issue of Islamist terror organizations, specifically AQIM, MUJAO, and Ansar al-Dine. After
a short-lived and ill-conceived “alliance” with these groups to counter the Malian government,
the MNLA turned quickly to lambasting them, distancing itself as much as possible from these
groups which were obscuring their legitimate efforts.51 One point made ad nauseum by the
MNLA about these Islamist groups was that they worked with the Malian government to move
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drugs and other illicit materials across Mali and the larger Sahel. It is not unlikely that narcotics
helped fund some of these militants’ operations but there is little in the way of evidence
connecting the trafficking with the Malian government.
In mid to late 2012 the MNLA began to repeatedly ask for negotiations with the Malian
government while maintaining a slight battlefield advantage at the time. What may have caused
this was not necessarily the loss of ground to Islamists but a combination of two other factors.
First, the MNLA may not have been receiving the media coverage, regionally or internationally,
that it wanted and wanted to avoid being burdened with the blame for all of the conflict. Second,
periods of relatively severe famine and drought across the Sahel affected pastoralism,
agriculture, and migration in a destabilizing way. Having already lost refugees to Mauritania,
Algeria, and other nearby countries, the MNLA needed talks to show to Malians and
international organizations that they were making positive progress and to attract support for
their fight. Late 2012 was a dark period for the MNLA as all of the aforementioned factors came
together coupled with the general conflict. Accusations by the MNLA of massacres against
Tuaregs by the Malian military and the MNLA belief that Radio Mali was being used in a
genocidal fashion, reminiscent of the Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda in 1994, was causing great
fear among MNLA leadership all the way down to the average Azawadi.
The highlighting event of 2013 in the conflict was easily France’s intervention against
Islamist groups in Mali. The anti-terror rhetoric from the MNLA continued and victories against
Islamist groups were heavily emphasized. For brief periods the Islamists were a temporarily
larger concern than the Malian government in terms of conflict for the MNLA. This situation
was exacerbated once the French left Mali and the MNLA was once again left with only other
small rebel groups and the Malian government to counter the Islamist threat. A final highlight in
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late 2013 was the MNLA pulling out of Kidal and fully respecting the 2013 Ouagadougou
Agreements, which did not last long, as well as some other agreements that the MNLA was
rather vague about. They may have been small or unofficial agreements made in private sessions
not heavily covered by the media. This emphasis on the French intervention and the anti-terror
and anti-narcotics struggle was the MNLA’s primary method of conveying the importance of
their struggle during the tumultuous year of 2013.
From 2013 into 2014 the MNLA addressed issues of women’s rights, youth support, and
a host of civil society and socio-political issues connected to the conflict and ongoing
negotiations. The MNLA has an extensive bureaucracy with officials tasked specifically with
these aspects of governance among countless other areas. The constant reiteration of a desire for
dialogue with the Malian government was also a noticeable theme. Referring to peace talks
throughout 2014 may have been a tactic to put the organization in a good position if conflict or
negotiations returned. Conflict came first and the negotiations started a few months later. A
general roadmap was even agreed on by the Malian government, the MNLA, and two of the
other major northern Mali rebel groups but like many previous agreements it never came to
fruition.52 However the MNLA’s insistence on being treated as the main rebel group in northern
Mali and various other divisions between the MNLA and other Tuareg rebels made this
agreement a fairly rare occurrence. The final notable series of posts marked the deaths of several
prominent MNLA sympathizers who appear to have been civil society leaders in northern Mali
who had historically opposed the central government in Bamako. These posts were unique
compared to the rest of the dataset and the few deaths at once were certainly an interesting
development considering many MNLA members and northern Malian citizens died over the
course of the conflict and almost none were given individual mention.
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6. Conclusions
The material that the MNLA publicly posts is valuable open-source information. Their website is
not a typical spout of terrorist or rebel rhetoric aimed at whoever will pay attention in a poor
attempt to coordinate what is said with what is done on the ground or at the negotiating table.
The MNLA’s public relations apparatus closely reflects events on the ground and its
commitment to secularism, highlighted by the distance the movement has, for the most part, kept
from Islamist organizations. While good information operations and media platforms have
benefits, these benefits can be difficult to translate into battlefield successes given the size and
financing of the French or Malian militaries relative to the rebels, the asymmetric forms of
warfare utilized by terrorist organizations, and extremely low levels of internet access in Mali. 53
The secondary hypotheses were not confirmed by the analysis. The results of brief tests
of these hypotheses will shed more light on the confirmation of the central hypothesis. The first
secondary hypothesis, that months with more events would contain more statements, was correct
but only by a small margin. There were 138 posts in 22 months without events averaging 6.2
posts per month. There were 114 posts in 16 months with events averaging 7.1 posts per month.
Arguments can be made about adding or removing certain events from the timeline but the
synthesis of media sources used to create the timeline in this research intended to highlight the
major events in the conflict. That said, there were more posts on average during months with
events, indicating that anticipation or experience of major conflict-related events sparked online
public relations initiatives for the MNLA.
The second secondary hypothesis was that the months of the French intervention would
generate more statements and harsher rhetoric. Both aspects of this hypothesis were
disconfirmed. The French intervention lasted from January to April 2013. There were 26 posts
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across this 4 month period averaging 6.5 posts per month. The remaining 34 months in the
dataset contained a total of 226 posts averaging 6.6 posts per month. The MNLA did not post an
average of more statements per month during the French intervention. As mentioned earlier in
this research the MNLA were viewed rather favorably by the French military during the
intervention and had a somewhat positive relationship with them. Harsh rhetoric against the
French was not used during this period or at all across the dataset. Furthermore, the MNLA’s
rhetoric against Islamist groups and the Malian government was not harsher than at any other
time in the dataset. Despite the French intervention, the MNLA did not experience any
transformation in the way they publicly felt about their opponents.
The third secondary hypothesis posited that the MNLA will put forth more statements
regarding their political and human rights concerns than on the specifics of their battlefield
operations. For referents, human rights and politics-international relations totaled 245 posts over
the course of the dataset while personnel announcements and military totaled 144 posts.
Regarding the intentions behind posts, activism and politics-international relations totaled 241
posts over the course of the dataset while military, military loss, and military victory posts
totaled 118 posts. This hypothesis was confirmed by the fact that posts related to MNLA politics
and human rights concerns were nearly double those related to military operations either as a
referent or as an intention. This makes sense for the MNLA, a rebel group challenging state
authority. Communicating certain aspects of military operations is important, but bringing the
narrative of the conflict beyond the local microcosms of northern Mali is what the MNLA need
to reach broader audiences and convince them of the righteousness of its actions and goals.
The main hypothesis, which stated that the content of MNLA posts will correlate with
events in the northern Mali conflict, brings together all five parts of the analysis: total posts;
57

promoters; targets; referents; and intentions. There are recognizable patterns in the data that
confirm correlations between what statements the MNLA disperses to the public and what is
happening in the conflict. The confirmation of this hypothesis is the strongest evidence that
MNLA public relations postings are valuable for predicting how the organization will respond to
and publicly address conflict-related events in the future.
The analysis of total posts, the most general level, revealed that the MNLA posts more
frequently when it is anticipating future conflict or new peace talks. The MNLA also posts more
frequently when operations are underway but a victor has not emerged from said operations yet.
Likewise the MNLA posts less when experiencing both military and political losses. The
organization is careful to strike the balance between supplying its audiences with information but
not directly displaying weakness in the form of losses and failed negotiations. As with many
rebel political organizations’ information apparatuses losses, political or military, are spun into
positives or explained by the pre-existing rebel narrative of state abuse.
The evolution of promoters authoring MNLA posts followed a relatively clear pattern.
Five eras of primary chargés de communication were identifiable with different primary and
secondary promoters throughout each section of the conflict. As the conflict progressed those
tasked with public communications stayed on longer and dominated the public relations
landscape more so than their predecessors. This pattern likely resulted from the MNLA needing
time to figure out how they would organize communications and their efforts in this domain
clearly improved over the years. Furthermore, the variety of MNLA officials charged with
communication points to a rotating system of leadership where the higher echelon take on
different responsibilities in order to become better informed and trained leaders while also
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getting to know different stakeholders and constituents in the conflict through different
organizational roles.
Patterns among the targets of MNLA posts emerged in relation to events in the conflict as
well. The international community was a consistently frequent target, highlighting the MNLA’s
desire to take their narrative to the global stage. Likewise, the MNLA aimed their messages at
international and regional organizations in an effort to gain political and diplomatic support that
could potentially lead to financial or military aid. The MNLA also targeted Malians, both
Azawadis and southerners. Without convincing northern Azawadis they were the best group to
represent their socio-political interests the MNLA could never maintain gains. Without pressure
from southerners, the government in Bamako would be more complacent regarding socioeconomic and political complaints from the northern populations.
The primary referents in MNLA postings were human rights, politics-international
relations, and military affairs. These topics dominated the group’s posts because MNLA believes
alleviating human rights suffering requires a combination of military resistance to form a new
state of Azawad and developing positive relations with other states and international
organizations to gain support for their endeavors. Personnel announcements and historyphilosophy were also scattered throughout to provide updates on the deaths and recruitment of
MNLA members and to periodically remind Azawadis and outside MNLA supporters of the
historic injustices exacted on northern Mali by the South. Religion as a referent was limited to
almost nothing beyond the popular Muslim holidays celebrated in northern Mali. The focus on
current human rights and political issues over religious and historical grievances highlights the
primary concern of the Tuareg rebels.
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Finally, the analysis of intentions revealed that activism and politics-international
relations were the most significant reasons for posting for the MNLA. Reaching new audiences
with a global narrative and establishing positive relationships with individual citizens and state
officials and international organization leaders were key priorities of the MNLA information
campaign. Aside from these major factors, communicating military information and battlefield
wins and losses was also a purpose that the website served.
It can therefore be said with relative certainty that there are correlations between MNLA
statements and conflict-related events in northern Mali. Clarifying these correlations are the
analyses of total posts and the more specific aspects of each post highlighted by the four primary
securitization categories of promoter, target, referent, and intention. Qualitative observations
across the available data also indicate several themes that were prevalent across MNLA posts
and give further aid to identifying and explaining correlations between the movement’s posts and
events in the conflict.
The implications of this research for U.S. national security are worth taking into account.
While the MNLA is not a direct threat to U.S. citizens or territory, the movement is a potential
ally against terrorists in the region. It is unlikely that the U.S. will intervene in the Sahel in the
near future in the way France has done. However, the MNLA’s support of France during the
intervention to counter Islamist advances in Mali shows that American allies can benefit from the
MNLA’s presence in the region. If the specific situation of northern Mali is not a national
security priority, anti-terrorism efforts in the Sahel do create more desirable conditions for the
U.S. and western Europe, and therefore are worth supporting.
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The method developed in this study and the findings could be replicated to other rebel
groups in the region and elsewhere. Better understanding a group’s intentions and activities can
help the U.S. select potential allies to provide support to, in the form of aid or military advisors.
The ability to accurately predict the responses of groups in the volatile Sahel will give the U.S.
and its allies analytical, political, and operational advantages among difficult and complex
human and physical terrain.
The advancement of localized, rural, and urban rebels in cyber space, mainly via the
Internet, is not necessarily a groundbreaking observation but this advent of information
dissemination has a significant impact upon state and sub-state responses to conflicts. Any
increase in a group’s information capabilities brings more public attention to the conflict in
general but also to government or coalition mistakes, human rights abuses, and conflicting
narratives. Before, rural citizens would often have to wait for news to get out by telephone and
be published or for word of mouth to spread the information. Mali’s Tuareg rebels may not
achieve the state of Azawad they so desperately desire but they have found new ways to compel
local, regional, and international stakeholders to consider their viewpoint and actively support it,
changing what conflict in Mali and the larger Sahel might look like in the future.
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http://mnlamov.net/actualites/251-communique-nd-49-arrestation-de-2-hautsresponsables-terroristes.html.
- “Communiqué N° 50/ Ménaka,exaction maliennes, appels au meurtre et forces d'interposition
onusiennes.” February 7, 2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/252-communique-nd-50menakaexaction-maliennes-appels-au-meurtre-et-forces-dinterposition-onusiennes.html.
- “Communiqué N°51/ Graves dérapages à Ménaka.” February 11, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/254-communique-nd51-graves-derapages-a-menaka.html.
- “Communiqué N° 52 / Déclaration du MNLA.” February 13, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/257-communique-nd-52-declaration-du-mnla.html.
- “Offensive militaire contre le MUJAO.” February 17, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/260-offensive-militaire-contre-le-mujao.html.
- “Communiqué N° 53 / Déploiement des casques bleus.” February 17, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/258-communique-nd-53-deploiement-des-casquesbleus.html.
- “Communiqué N° 54: Plainte à la Cour pénale internationale contre le Mali.” February 22,
2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/259-communique-nd-54-plainte-a-la-cour-penaleinternationale-contre-le-mali.html.
- “Communiqué N° 55: Evènements de In Khallil.” February 24, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/261-communique-nd-55-evenements-de-in-khallil.html.
- “Attaque terroriste contre le MNLA à Kidal.” February 26, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/263-attaque-terroriste-contre-le-mnla-a-kidal.html.
- “Communiqué N°56/ Déclaration de la CEDEAO.” March 6, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/264-communique-nd56-declaration-de-la-cedeao.html.
- “Communiqué N° 57: Manuscrits de Tombouctou.” March 11, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/265-communique-nd-57-manuscrits-de-tombouctou.html.
- “URGENT/ Témoignages forcés à Doro.” March 20, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/268-urgent-temoignages-forces-a-doro.html.
- “Démenti à l'article d' ‘Almassae’.” March 21, 2013.
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http://mnlamov.net/actualites/269-dementi-a-larticle-d-qalmassaeq.html.
- “Accrochage à Tin Tabanawt.” March 25, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/270-accrochage-a-tin-tabanawt.html.
- “Combats contre le MUJAO à Anefis.” March 30, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/271-combats-contre-le-mujao-a-anefis.html.
- “Combats contre le groupe terroriste ‘les signataires par le sang’.” April 1, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/272-combats-contre-le-groupe-terroriste-q-les-signatairespar-le-sangq.html.
- “Communiqué N° 58.” April 20, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/273-communique-nd-58.html.
- “Anefis : Attaque terroriste du Mujao sur une position du MNLA.” April 24, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/275-anefis-attaque-terroriste-du-mujao-sur-une-positiondu-mnla.html.
- “Communiqué du MNLA suite aux échanges avec la délégation des Nations Unies.” April 27,
2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/276-communique-du-mnla-suite-aux-echanges-avecla-delegation-des-nations-unies.html.
- “Aucune campagne de dénigrement ne viendra a bout de l'union des azawadiens.” May 4, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/277-aucune-campagne-de-denigrement-ne-viendra-a-boutde-lunion-des-azawadiens.html.
- “Lettre ouverte du Secrétaire Général du MNLA.” May 8, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/278-lettre-ouverte-du-secretaire-general-du-mnla.html.
- “Anefis : Une colonne terroriste battant pavillon noir des djihadistes attaque le MNLA.” May
17, 2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/279-anefis-une-colonne-terroriste-battantpavillon-noir-des-djihadistes-attaque-le-mnla.html.
- “Communiqué du Secrétaire Général du MNLA.” May 17, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/281-communique-du-secretaire-general-du-mnla.html.
- “Bilan de l'attaque de la colonne terroriste du Mujao contre le MNLA à Anefis.” May 18, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/282-bilan-de-lattaque-de-la-colonne-terroriste-du-mujaocontre-le-mnla-a-anefis.html.
- “Communiqué du MNLA relatif aux combats d'Anefis et au HCUA.” May 21, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/283-communique-du-mnla-relatif-aux-combats-danefis-etau-hcua.html.
- “Communiqué du MNLA relatifs aux exactions et aux négociations.” May 30, 2013.
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http://mnlamov.net/actualites/284-communique-du-mnla-relatifs-aux-exactions-et-auxnegociations.html.
- “Le MNLA condamne l'attaque terroriste contre un soldat français.” June 2, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/285-le-mnla-condamne-lattaque-terroriste-contre-un-soldatfrancais.html.
- “Expulsion des infiltrés maliens et relations de l'armée malienne avec les réseaux terrorists.”
June 4, 2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/288-expulsion-desinfiltres-maliens-etrelations-de-larmee-malienne-avec-les-reseaux-terroristes.html.
- “Election présidentielle et accords de Ouagadougou.” August 6, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/292-election-presidentielle-et-accords-deouagadougou.html.
- “Violations des accords de Ouagadougou.” September 14, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/294-violations-des-accords-de-ouagadougou.html.
- “Visite gouvernementale malienne et violente répression contre les femmes à Kidal.”
September 15, 2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/296-visite-gouvernementalemalienne-et-violente-repression-contre-les-femmes-a-kidal.html.
- “Déclaration du Conseil Révolutionnaire.” September 20, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/297-declaration-du-conseil-revolutionnaire.html.
- “Message du Secretaire General du MNLA.” September 24, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/299-message-du-secretaire-general-du-mnla.html.
- “SUSPENSION DE LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE L'ACCORD CADRE DE OUGADOUGOU.”
September 27, 2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/300-suspension-de-la-mise-en-oeuvrede-laccord-cadre-de-ougadougou.html.
- “Attentat suicide à Tombouctou.” September 27, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/301-attentat-suicide-a-tombouctou.html.
- “Declaration finale journées de concertations du MNLA.” October 18, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/304-declaration-finale-journees-de-concertations-dumnla.html.
- “Engagement volontaire et disponibilité au dialogue.” October 19, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/305-engagement-volontaire-et-disponibilite-audialogue.html.
- “Attentat suicide à Tessalit.” October 22, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/306-attentat-suicide-a-tessalit.html.
- “Libération des otages Français d'Arlit.” October 28, 2013.
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http://mnlamov.net/actualites/307-liberation-des-otages-francais-darlit.html.
- “Execution de deux journalistes français à Kidal.” November 2, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/308-execution-de-deux-journalistes-francais-a-kidal.html.
- “Gouvernorat de Kidal et arrangements sécuritaires.” November 6, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/310-gouvernorat-de-kidal-et-arrangementssecuritaires.html.
- “Exécution sommaire et violation du cessez le feu par l’armée malienne.” November 8, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/312-execution-sommaire-et-violation-du-cessez-le-feu-parlarmee-malienne.html.
- “Communiqué relatif au Gouvernorat de Kidal et à la Radio Azawad.” November 9, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/314-communique-relatif-au-gouvernorat-de-kidal-et-a-laradio-azawad.html.
- “Declaration du Conseil révolutionnaire du MNLA.” November 13, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/315-declaration-du-conseil-revolutionnaire-du-mnla.html.
- “Concessions du MNLA et non respect de ses engagements de la partie gouvernementale
malienne.” November 14, 2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/316-concessions-du-mnlaet-non-respect-de-ses-engagements-de-la-partie-gouvernementale-malienne.html.
- “Attaque terroriste du MUJAO : le chef de la fraction Imididaghen et sa fillette de 3 ans
assassinés.” November 21, 2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/317-attaque-terroriste-dumujao-le-chef-de-la-fraction-imididaghen-et-sa-fillette-de-3-ans-assassines.html.
- “Adhésion de l’Azawad à l’Organisation des Etats Africains Émergents (OEAS).” November
22, 2013. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/319-adhesion-de-lazawad-a-lorganisation-desetats-africains-emergents-oeas.html.
- “L'armée malienne ouvre le feu sur la population civile.” November 28, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/321-larmee-malienne-ouvre-le-feu-sur-la-populationcivile.html.
- “Attentat suicide à Kidal.” December 14, 2013.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/323-attentat-suicide-a-kidal.html.
- “Tirs terroriste sur la ville de Kidal.” January 1, 2014
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/324-tirs-terroriste-sur-la-ville-de-kidal.html.
- “Arrestations arbitraires et exactions sur des civils Azawadiens.” January 5, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/325-arrestations-arbitraires-et-exactions-sur-des-civilsazawadiens.html.
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- “Urgent! Enlèvement d'un responsable politique du MNLA à Tessalit.” January 13, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/326-urgent-enlevement-dun-responsable-politique-dumnla-a-tessalit.html.
- “Urgent! Assassinat d'un jeune sous-officier du MNLA.” January 16, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/327-urgentassassinat-dun-jeune-sous-officier-dumnla.html.
- “Info: manifestation géante actuellement en cours à Kidal.” January 16, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/328-info-manifestation-geante-actuellement-en-cours-akidal.html.
- “Resolutions de la renconference constitutive des femmes de l'Azawad.” January 23, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/329-resolutions-de-la-renconference-constitutive-desfemmes-de-lazawad.html.
- “Le MNLA reçu par sa Majesté le Roi Mohamed VI du Maroc.” January 31, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/330-le-mnla-recu-par-sa-majeste-le-roi-mohamed-vi-dumaroc.html.
- “L'organisation terroriste du MUJAO execute 25 civils Touaregs à Tamkoutate.” February 7,
2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/331-lorganisation-terroriste-du-mujao-execute-25civils-touaregs-a-tamkoutate.html.
- “Combats et bilan des affrontements contre les Terroristes du MUJAO.” February 9, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/332-combats-et-bilan-des-affrontements-contre-lesterroristes-du-mujao.html.
- “Visite d'Etat d'une délégation du MNLA en Mauritanie et au Niger.” March 2, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/333-visite-detat-dune-delegation-du-mnla-en-mauritanie-etau-niger.html.
- “Le commandant membre de la commission de vérification des accords Ahabi Ag Ahmeyad
gravement blesse.” March 4, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/334-le-commandantmembre-de-la-commission-de-verification-des-accords-ahabi-ag-ahmeyad-gravementblesse.html.
- “Aucune dissidence, aucune division au sein du MNLA.” March 11, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/335-aucune-dissidence-aucune-division-au-sein-dumnla.html.
- “Le MNLA reçu en audience par le ministère Russe des affaires Etrangères.” March 14, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/337-le-mnla-recu-en-audience-par-le-ministere-russe-desaffaires-etrangeres.html.
- “Assemblée générale du conseil consultatif du MNLA.” April 3, 2014.
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http://mnlamov.net/actualites/338-assemblee-generale-du-conseil-consultatif-dumnla.html.
- “le MNLA affronte durant deux jours les hordes terroristes du mujao.” May 2, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/339-le-mnla-affronte-durant-deux-jours-les-hordesterroristes-du-mujao.html.
- “Declaration finale de la rencontre de concertation interne du MNLA; les 29; 30; 1er et 02 Mai
2014.” May 2, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/340-declaration-finale-de-larencontre-de-concertation-interne-du-mnla-les-29-30-1er-et-02-mai-2014.html.
- “Manifestation populaire a Kidal contre l’arrivée du premier ministre malien et graves
violations.” May 16, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/341-manifestation-populaire-akidal-contre-larrivee-du-premier-ministre-malien-et-graves-violations.html.
- “Violents combats à Kidal entre les forces de Azawad et l’armée malienne.” May 16, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/342-violents-combats-a-kidal-entre-les-forces-de-azawadet-larmee-malienne.html.
- “Le gouvernorat de Kidal passe sous copntrole des forces de l’Azawad.” May 17, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/343-le-gouvernorat-de-kidal-passe-sous-copntrole-desforces-de-lazawad.html.
- “Bilan humain des combats du 17 Mai à Kidal.” May 18, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/344-bilan-humain-des-combats-du-17-mai-a-kidal.html.
- “Le MNLA appelle à la retenue et dement les propos mensongers des autorités de Bamako.”
May 18, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/345-le-mnla-appelle-a-la-retenue-et-dementles-propos-mensongers-des-autorites-de-bamako.html.
- “Déclaration de Monsieur Bilal Ag Acherif Secretaire général du MNLA President du
CTEA.” May 19, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/346-declaration-de-monsieur-bilalag-acherif-secretaire-general-du-mnla-president-du-ctea.html.
- “Liberation des prisonniers de guerre arretés lors des combats du 17 Mai 2014 à Kidal.” May
19, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/347-liberation-des-prisonniers-de-guerre-arreteslors-des-combats-du-17-mai-2014-a-kidal.html.
- “Communiqué conjoints des mouvements de l’Azawad.” May 19, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/348-communique-conjoints-des-mouvements-delazawad.html.
- “Appel! l'armée malienne massacre tire à larme lourde sur la ville et la population de Kidal.”
May 21, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/350-appel-larmee-malienne-massacre-tirea-larme-lourde-sur-la-ville-et-la-population-de-kidal.html.
79

- “Violation du cessez-le-feu : l’armée malienne déclara la guerre.” May 21, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/351-violation-du-cessez-le-feu-larmee-malienne-declara-laguerre.html.
- “Kidal est desormais sous contrôle des forces de l'Azawad.” May 21, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/352-kidal-est-desormais-sous-controle-des-forces-delazawad.html.
- “Violents combats en cours entre les forces de l'Azawad et le MUJAO à Tabankort.” May 24,
2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/353-violents-combats-en-cours-entre-les-forces-delazawad-et-le-mujao-a-tabankort.html.
- “Remise du gouvernorat de Kidal par le MNLA à la Communauté internationale.” May 26,
2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/354-remise-du-gouvernorat-de-kidal-par-le-mnla-ala-communaute-internationale.html.
- “Réaction du MNLA liée aux événements du 17 Mai 14 de Kidal.” May 26, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/355-reaction-du-mnla-liee-aux-evenements-du-17-mai-14de-kidal.html.
- “Declaration finale de la jeunesse Imajaghan de Menaka.” May 28, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/356-declaration-finale-de-la-jeunesse-imajaghan-demenaka.html.
- “Déclaration des Secrétaires Généraux.” June 9, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/357-declaration-des-secretaires-generaux.html.
- “Declaration d'Alger des trois Secrétaires généraux.” June 10, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/358-declaration-dalger-des-trois-secretaires-generaux.html.
- “Le MNLA exhorte à la création d'une Commission d'enquête internationale sur les exactions.”
June 21, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/359-le-mnla-exhorte-a-la-creation-dunecommission-denquete-internationale-sur-les-exactions.html.
- “Arrestations arbitraires de civils azawadiens innocents par l'armée malienne.” June 27, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/360-arrestations-arbitraires-de-civils-azawadiensinnocents-par-larmee-malienne.html.
- “Actes de provocation et violation de cessez le feu.” July 7, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/361-actes-de-provocation-et-violation-de-cessez-lefeu.html.
- “Urgent: violents combats opposent les forces de l'Azawad à l'armée maliennes et milices
affiliées.” July 11, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/362-urgent-violents-combatsopposent-les-forces-de-lazawad-a-larmee-maliennes-et-milices-affiliees.html.
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- “Combats d'Anefis du 11 Juillet 2014 et réalité des événements.” July 14, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/363-combats-danefis-du-11-juillet-2014-et-realite-desevenements.html.
- “FEUILLE DE ROUTE DES NÉGOCIATIONS COORDINATION DES MOUVEMENTS
(MNLA, HCUA, MAA). July 16, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/365-feuille-deroute-des-negociations-coordination-des-mouvements-mnla-hcua-maa.html.
- “Echange de prisonniers et libération d'azawadiens injustement détenus à Bamako.” July 17,
2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/366-echange-de-prisonniers-et-liberationdazawadiens-injustement-detenus-a-bamako.html.
- “Le MNLA et le MAA affrontent pendant plusieurs jours la coalition milices progouvernementales-mujao.” July 21, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/367-le-mnla-etle-maa-affrontent-pendant-plusieurs-jours-la-coalition-milices-pro-gouvernementalesmujao.html.
- “Crash de l’avion AH 5017 de Air Algérie; le MNLA compati...” July 24, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/368-crash-de-lavion-ah-5017-de-air-algerie-le-mnlacompati.html.
- “Frappes françaises au Nord de Tombouctou et combats à Lerneb.” August 11, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/369-frappes-francaises-au-nord-de-tombouctou-et-combatsa-lerneb.html.
- “Attentat suicide à Ber, le MNLA présente ses condoléances.” August 16, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/370-attentat-suicide-a-ber-le-mnla-presente-sescondoleances.html.
- “RENCONTRE DES MOUVEMENTS DE L’AZAWAD A OUAGADOUGOU.” August 29,
2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/372-rencontre-des-mouvements-de-lazawad-aouagadougou.html.
- “Discours de la Coordination MNLA-HCUA-MAA à Alger.” September 4, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/373-discours-de-la-coordination-mnla-hcua-maa-aalger.html.
- “Le MNLA présente ses condoléances à la MINUSMA.” September 4, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/374-le-mnla-presente-ses-condoleances-a-la-minusma.html.
- “Le MNLA présente ses condoléances à la famille de feu Winna.” September 8, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/375-le-mnla-presente-ses-condoleances-a-la-famille-defeu-winna.html.
- “La société civile Azawadienne à la hauteur des attentes à Alger.” September 8, 2014.
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http://mnlamov.net/actualites/376-la-societe-civile-azawadienne-a-la-hauteur-desattentes-a-alger.html.
- “4ème CONGRES ORDINAIRE DU CONSEIL REVOLUTIONNAIRE DU MNLA.”
September 9, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/377-4eme-congres-ordinaire-duconseil-revolutionnairendu-mnla.html.
- “OUVERTURE AUX PAYS BAS DU NEW WORLD EMBASSY OF AZAWAD.”
September 12, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/378-ouverture-aux-pays-bas-du-newworld-embassy-of-azawad.html.
- “Protocole d’entente.” September 13, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/379-protocoledentente.html.
- “Réaction du Mouvement National de libération de l’Azawad à la terreur de Zouera.”
September 24, 2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/380-reaction-du-mouvement-nationalde-liberation-de-lazawad-a-la-terreur-de-zouera.html.
- “Communiqué final sur la deuxième phase du processus d’Alger.” September 26, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/381-communique-final-sur-la-deuxieme-phase-duprocessus-dalger.html.
- “Réaction suite à l’arrestation d’un haut responsable du MNLA.” September 29, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/382-reaction-suite-a-larrestation-dun-haut-responsable-dumnla.html.
- “Mohamed Zeiny Aguissa est libre.” October 2, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/383-mohamed-zeiny-aguissa-est-libre.html.
- “Le MNLA présente ses condoléances à la MINUSMA et au Peuple Nigérien.” October 3,
2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/384-le-mnla-presente-ses-condoleances-a-laminusma-et-au-peuple-nigerien.html.
- “Le Droit à l’éducation pour tous.” October 5, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/385-le-droit-a-leducation-pour-tous.html.
- “Le MNLA condamne et présente ses condoléances.” October 8, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/386-le-mnla-condamne-et-presente-ses-condoleances.html.
- “Urgent : Une voiture du MNLA vient de sauter sur une mine à kidal.” October 12, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/387-urgent-une-voiture-du-mnla-vient-de-sauter-sur-unemine-a-kidal.html.
- “Violation du cessez-le-feu par le Mali.” October 16, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/389-violation-du-cessez-le-feu-par-le-mali.html.
- “Bilan des Affrontements N’tililte.” October 17, 2014.
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http://mnlamov.net/actualites/390-bilan-des-affrontements-ntililte.html.
- “Troisième Phase des négociations d’Alger.” October 26, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/391-troisieme-phase-des-negociations-dalger.html.
- “Prise d’Inafarak à la frontière algérienne tôt ce matin.” October 26, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/392-prise-dinafarak-a-la-frontiere-algerienne-tot-cematin.html.
- “La coordination militaire de l’Azawad est opérationnelle.” October 28, 2014.
http://mnlamov.net/actualites/393-la-coordination-militaire-de-lazawad-estoperationnelle.html.
- “Violation du cessez-le-feu et allégations de la part du Gouvernement malien.” November 3,
2014. http://mnlamov.net/actualites/394-violation-du-cessez-le-feu-et-allegations-de-lapart-du-gouvernement-malien.html.
- “Nos condoléances et condamnations.” November 21, 2014.
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